Trudeau v. Google by Northern District of California
 COOLEY LLP 
ATTO RN EY S AT LAW 
SAN  FR AN C I SC O 
 
  GOOGLE’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, OR ALTERNATIVELY TO DISMISS THE FAC, AND RJN 
(CASE NO. 18-CV-00947 BLF)  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
COOLEY LLP MICHAEL G. RHODES (116127) (rhodesmg@cooley.com) WHITTY SOMVICHIAN (194463)  (wsomvichian@cooley.com) MATTHEW M. BROWN (264817) (brownmm@cooley.com) KELLY E. FABIAN (310359) (kfabian@cooley.com)  101 California Street, 5th Floor San Francisco, CA  94111-5800 Telephone: (415) 693-2000 Facsimile: (415) 693-2222 
Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE LLC 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
MARK TRUDEAU and TROY MARTIAL ARTS INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
GOOGLE, LLC, 
Defendant. 
Case No.  18-cv-00947 BLF 
GOOGLE’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Date: September 27, 2018 Time:  9:00 a.m. Courtroom:  3 Judge:  Hon. Beth L. Freeman  
 
Case 5:18-cv-00947-BLF   Document 25   Filed 05/02/18   Page 1 of 33
 COOLEY LLP 
ATTO RN EY S AT LAW 
SAN  FR AN C I SC O 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Page 
 
 
 i  
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT ................................................................................................ 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED .................................................................................. 1 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... 2 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 2 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................................. 3 
A. The Parties ................................................................................................................... 3 
B. The AdWords Terms of Service Contain a Broad Arbitration Provision .................... 3 
III. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION .............................................................................. 6 
A. Legal Standards. ........................................................................................................... 6 
B. Plaintiffs Agreed to Arbitrate the Claims in the Complaint and That Agreement Must be Enforced Under the FAA ............................................................ 6 
C. The Dispute Resolution Agreement is Not Unconscionable ....................................... 7 
1. The Agreement is Not Procedurally Unconscionable Because Plaintiffs had the Ability to Freely Opt Out of Arbitration ............................................. 7 
2. The Agreement is Not Substantively Unconscionable .................................... 9 
D. All Claims in the FAC Fall Within the Broad Scope of the Dispute Resolution Agreement .................................................................................................................. 12 
E. The Court Should Compel Arbitration of All Claims Asserted by Mr. Trudeau ...... 13 
IV. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ........................................ 13 
A. Additional Background Re: Negative Keywords and the Google Disclosures Omitted From the Complaint ..................................................................................... 13 
B. Motion to Dismiss Standards ..................................................................................... 15 
C. Plaintiffs’ Breach of Contract Claim Fails For Multiple Reasons ............................. 16 
1. Plaintiffs Do Not Identify Any Contract Term That Was Breached ............. 16 
2. No Allegation of Compliance ........................................................................ 17 
D. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Breach of Implied Covenant Fails Along With the Breach of Contract Claim ....................................................................................................... 17 
E. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege the Reasonable Reliance Needed to Support Their Fraud-Based Claims ................................................................................................... 18 
F. Plaintiffs’ Claims Under the Other Prongs of UCL Also Fail as a Matter of Law ............................................................................................................................ 20 
1. Plaintiffs Allege No “Unfair” Conduct .......................................................... 20 
2. Plaintiffs Allege No “Unlawful” Conduct ..................................................... 22 
G. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Declaratory Relief ............................................... 22 
H. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Unjust Enrichment .............................................. 23 
V. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE ........ 23 
Case 5:18-cv-00947-BLF   Document 25   Filed 05/02/18   Page 2 of 33
 COOLEY LLP 
ATTO RN EY S AT LAW 
SAN  FR AN C I SC O 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(continued) 
Page 
 
 ii  
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 25 
Case 5:18-cv-00947-BLF   Document 25   Filed 05/02/18   Page 3 of 33
 COOLEY LLP 
ATTO RN EY S AT LAW 
SAN  FR AN C I SC O 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
Page(s) 
 iii. GOOGLE’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, OR ALTERNATIVELY TO DISMISS THE FAC, AND RJN (CASE NO. 18-CV-00947 BLF)  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Cases 
AccuImage Diagnostics Corp. v. Terarecon, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ...........................................................................................22 
AdTrader, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-07082-BLF, 2018 WL 1876950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) ............................... passim 
Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349 (2d Cir. 1999)...........................................................................................................13 
Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) .....................................................................................................................6, 9 
In re Apple & AT & TM Antitrust Litig., 826 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2011) .........................................................................................13 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) .....................................................................................................................6, 9 
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986) .........................................................................................................................6 
Avila v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 10-CV-05485-LHK, 2010 WL 5071714 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) ........................................18 
Baxter v. Intelius, Inc., No. SACV 09-1031, 2010 WL 3791487 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010) ............................................18 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .......................................................................................................................15 
Bradford v. Flagship Facility Servs. Inc., No. 17-CV-01245, 2017 WL 3130072 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2017) ...................................................9 
Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 168 Cal. App. 4th 938 (2008) ..................................................................................................11, 19 
Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) .......................................................................................................12 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002) .........................................................................................................7 
Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824 (2006) ........................................................................................................21 
Davidson v. Wakefield, 167 F. App’x 588 (9th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................................21 
Case 5:18-cv-00947-BLF   Document 25   Filed 05/02/18   Page 4 of 33
 COOLEY LLP 
ATTO RN EY S AT LAW 
SAN  FR AN C I SC O 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
(continued) 
Page(s) 
 iv. GOOGLE’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, OR ALTERNATIVELY TO DISMISS THE FAC, AND RJN (CASE NO. 5:18-CV-00753 BLF)  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................11, 19 
DiGiacomo v. Ex’pression Ctr. for New Media Inc., No. 08-cv-1768, 2008 WL 4239830 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2008) ...................................................12 
Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Ass’n, 182 Cal. App. 4th 247 (2010) ........................................................................................................21 
Dunkel v. eBay Inc., No. 5:12-CV-01452-EJD, 2013 WL 415584, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2013) ..........................16 
Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1350 (2010) ......................................................................................................23 
Dzinesquare, Inc. v. Armano Luxury Alloys, Inc., No. 14-1918, 2014 WL 12597154 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2014) .......................................................24 
Evergreen Media Holdings, LLC v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, No. 15-01648, 2015 WL 12765630 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2015) .....................................................13 
In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ...........................................................................................23 
Fagerstrom v. Amazon.com, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (S.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Wiseley v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 709 F. App’x 862 (9th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................................7 
Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ...................................................................................7, 11, 17 
Ferguson v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 733 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013) .........................................................................................................12 
Frances Kenny Family Tr. v. World Savs. Bank FSB, No. 04-3724, 2005 WL 106792 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2005) ............................................................24 
Free Range Content, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 14-cv-02329, 2016 WL 2902332 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2016 ...................................................11 
Frezza v. Google Inc., No. 5:12-CV-00237, 2013 WL 1736788 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013) .............................................16 
GA Escrow, LLC v. Autonomy Corp. PLC, No. 08-01784, 2008 WL 4848036 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2008) ........................................................23 
Glaude v. Macy’s Inc., No. 12-cv-5179, 2012 WL 6019069 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) ........................................................6 
Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574 (W.D.N.C. 2000) ..................................................................................................11 
Case 5:18-cv-00947-BLF   Document 25   Filed 05/02/18   Page 5 of 33
 COOLEY LLP 
ATTO RN EY S AT LAW 
SAN  FR AN C I SC O 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
(continued) 
Page(s) 
 v. GOOGLE’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, OR ALTERNATIVELY TO DISMISS THE FAC, AND RJN (CASE NO. 5:18-CV-00753 BLF)  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Guerard v. CBA Financial Corp.,   2009 WL 3152055 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009) ..............................................................................22 
Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317 (2000) ...................................................................................................................18 
Hartless v. Clorox Co., No. 06-cv-2705, 2007 WL 3245260 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2007) ......................................................22 
Hoekman v. Tamko Bldg. Prods., No. 14-1581, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113414 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) .......................................9 
Hovsepian v. Apple, Inc., No. 08-5788, 2009 WL 5069144 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2009) .........................................................20 
Janda v. T-Mobile, USA, Inc., No. 05-03729, 2009 WL 667206 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2009) ........................................................22 
Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................19, 20 
Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) .........................................................................................7 
Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 06-2057, 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) ..........................................................24 
Las Vegas Sands, Inc. v. Culinary Workers Union Local No. 226, 82 Fed. Appx. 580 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................12 
In re: Lithium Ion Battery Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-02420, 2016 WL 5791357 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016)..................................................10 
Lucas v. Hertz Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. Cal. 2012) .............................................................................................8 
McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal. App. 4th 379 (2004) ........................................................................................................23 
McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457 (2006) ......................................................................................................17 
Miron v. Herbalife Int’l, Inc., 11 F. App’x. 927 (9th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................................16 
Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................7, 8, 9 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) .............................................................................................................................6 
Case 5:18-cv-00947-BLF   Document 25   Filed 05/02/18   Page 6 of 33
 COOLEY LLP 
ATTO RN EY S AT LAW 
SAN  FR AN C I SC O 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
(continued) 
Page(s) 
 vi. GOOGLE’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, OR ALTERNATIVELY TO DISMISS THE FAC, AND RJN (CASE NO. 5:18-CV-00753 BLF)  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001) .........................................................................................................15 
Parrish v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ...................................................................................16, 17 
Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ...........................................................................................25 
Rosado v. eBay, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-04005, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89863 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2014) ...........................19 
Samura v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1284 (1993) ........................................................................................................22 
San Miguel v. HP Inc., No. 5:16-CV-05820, 2018 WL 1536766 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2018) ............................................21 
Sharp v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 14-CV-00831, 2015 WL 106844 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2015), aff’d, 701 F. App’x 596 (9th Cir. 2017) .........................................................................................................................24 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) .........................................................................................................................6 
Singh v. Google Inc., No. 16-CV-03734, 2017 WL 2404986 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2017) ..................................................21 
Solis v. Webb, 931 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ...........................................................................................24 
Song fi Inc. v. Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ...........................................................................................24 
Spiegler v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2008) .........................................................................................22 
Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2011)..........................................................................................15 
Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2007) .........................................................................................................25 
In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009) ...................................................................................................................18 
Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2016) .........................................................................................................9 
Ulbrich v. Overstock.com, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 924 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ...........................................................................................10 
Case 5:18-cv-00947-BLF   Document 25   Filed 05/02/18   Page 7 of 33
 COOLEY LLP 
ATTO RN EY S AT LAW 
SAN  FR AN C I SC O 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
(continued) 
Page(s) 
 vii. GOOGLE’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, OR ALTERNATIVELY TO DISMISS THE FAC, AND RJN (CASE NO. 5:18-CV-00753 BLF)  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2003) .........................................................................................................24 
In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (D. Kan. 2003) ............................................................................................10 
ValueSelling Assocs., LLC v. Temple, No. 09 CV 1493, 2009 WL 3736264 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009) .....................................................12 
In re Verisign, Inc., Derivative Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2007) .........................................................................................10 
Woods v. Google, Inc., 5:11-cv-01263, 889 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2012)....................................................19, 20, 21 
Wornum v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., No. 11-2189, 2011 WL 3516055 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011) ........................................................22 
Statutes 
9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (Federal Arbitration Act) ..................................................................................1, 6 
9 U.S.C. § 206 ........................................................................................................................................1 
False Advertising Law, Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17500 et seq. .....................12, 18, 19, 22 
Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. ............................ passim 
Other Authorities 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ..................................................................................................................16, 19, 20 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)......................................................................................................................1, 6 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)..............................................................................................................1, 15, 24 
Fed. R. Evid. 201 .................................................................................................................................24 
 
Case 5:18-cv-00947-BLF   Document 25   Filed 05/02/18   Page 8 of 33
 COOLEY LLP 
ATTO RN EY S AT LAW 
SAN  FR AN C I SC O 
 
 1. GOOGLE’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, OR ALTERNATIVELY TO DISMISS THE FAC, AND RJN (CASE NO. 18-CV-00947 BLF)  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE;  STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 27, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as 
this Motion may be heard, in Courtroom 3 of the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California, located at 280 South 1st Street, San Jose, CA 95113, defendant Google LLC (“Google”) 
will and hereby does move the Court, pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 206 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1), for an order compelling arbitration and thus dismissing with prejudice all claims asserted 
against Google in the First Amended Complaint (the “Complaint” or “FAC”) filed by plaintiffs Mark 
Trudeau and Troy Martial Arts Inc. (“Plaintiffs”).  In the alternative, Google will and hereby does 
move the Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for an order dismissing with 
prejudice all claims asserted against Google in the Complaint.  If the Court is inclined to compel 
arbitration without dismissing the Complaint, then Google requests a stay of all proceedings pending 
arbitration under Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. 
The motion to compel arbitration is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Compel Arbitration, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities, the concurrently filed Declaration of Sue-Jean Sung (“Decl.”), the pleadings on file, oral 
argument of counsel, and such other materials and argument as may be presented in connection with 
the hearing of this motion. Google also moves the Court to take judicial notice of the Exhibits B, C, 
F, G, and H attached to the Declaration of Sue-Jean Sung, and to consider Exhibits B, C, and H under 
the incorporation by reference doctrine, in support of the Motion to Dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 
1. Should the Court compel Plaintiffs to arbitrate the claims in the FAC, where Plaintiffs 
expressly agreed to arbitrate all disputes and claims involving their AdWords account and declined to 
exercise their right to “freely opt out of” arbitration?  AdTrader, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-
07082-BLF, 2018 WL 1876950, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018). 
2. If the Court declines to compel arbitration, should the FAC be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim where the obligation that Plaintiffs seek to impose, relating to “negative keywords,” is 
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expressly disclaimed by Google in the very webpage on which Plaintiffs rely? 
3.  Should the Court grant judicial notice of Exhibits B, C, F, G, and H attached to the 
Sung Declaration, and consider Exhibits B, C, and H under the incorporation by reference doctrine, in 
support of the Motion to Dismiss? 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This is a straightforward motion to enforce Plaintiffs’ express agreement to arbitrate.  As the 
Court is aware from the AdTrader matter, Google amended the Terms of Service for its AdWords 
service in September 2017 to include a new Dispute Resolution Agreement that requires individual 
arbitration of disputes.  Plaintiffs received multiple notices of these amended terms and were notified 
that they could freely opt out of the Dispute Resolution Agreement, but they expressly agreed to the 
new Terms of Service in their entirety without opting out of arbitration.  Plaintiffs now claim it would 
be unconscionable to enforce their agreement, parroting in large part the arguments from AdTrader 
(brought by the same counsel for Plaintiffs here).  Among other allegations, Plaintiffs falsely claim 
that “[t]he new arbitration clause … [was] presented as a take-it-or-leave it provision to Plaintiffs,” 
without even acknowledging the existence of the opt out.  (Compl. ¶ 113.)  Plaintiffs’ efforts to avoid 
arbitration are baseless—indeed, any perceived harm from being compelled to arbitrate would be 
entirely “self-inflicted,” given Plaintiffs’ voluntary choice not to opt out of the Dispute Resolution 
Agreement.  AdTrader, 2018 WL 1876950, at *5.  The Court should dismiss the FAC and compel 
arbitration consistent with the parties’ agreement. 
If for some reason the Court declines to compel arbitration, it should nevertheless dismiss all 
claims in the FAC with prejudice for failure to state any viable claim.  Plaintiffs complain that Google 
does not undertake certain specific steps when implementing “negative keywords,” which are terms 
that advertisers can select to refine when their ads will be shown (and not shown) on the AdWords 
platform.  Specifically, Plaintiffs complain that Google shows ads in response to searches in which a 
user misspells or uses a variation of a negative keyword in a Google search.  But Plaintiffs do not 
allege any contract term or disclosure that obligates Google to correct misspelling and variations when 
applying negative keywords.  Instead, Plaintiffs cherry-pick language from Google’s Help Center page 
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about negative keywords to create the misimpression of an obligation, while strategically omitting to 
mention the disclosures on the very same page explaining that advertisers must undertake the steps 
that Plaintiffs seek to impose on Google. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Parties. 
Defendant is Google LLC (“Google”).  (Compl. ¶ 12.)  As relevant here, Google operates an 
online advertising platform, known as “AdWords,” that allows businesses to display ads in various 
ways online, including next to search results on Google’s search engine (additional details are 
discussed below at Section IV(A)).  (Compl. ¶¶ 19-21; Decl. ¶ 3.) 
Plaintiff Mark Trudeau is the co-owner of Plaintiff Troy Martial Arts Inc. (“Troy Martial 
Arts”), a corporation doing business in Troy, Michigan.  Plaintiffs “accepted, by way of a clickwrap 
contract, the AdWords terms of service” for the first time in 2012 and have advertised through 
AdWords since that time.1  (Compl. ¶ 32; Decl. ¶¶ 14-17.)   
B. The AdWords Terms of Service Contain a Broad Arbitration Provision.  
Google modified the AdWords Terms of Service in February 2013 and September 2017.  This 
dispute is governed by the September 2017 version of the AdWords Terms of Service (“2017 
AdWords TOS”), which supersedes previous versions.  (Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10, Ex. C.)   
Google notified AdWords users of the September 2017 AdWords TOS in various ways, 
including direct emails, a public blog post, and alerts shown to advertisers when they accessed their 
AdWords accounts.  (Decl. ¶ 7.)  In these notices, Google alerted users that the 2017 AdWords TOS 
includes a new arbitration agreement (the “Dispute Resolution Agreement”) that advertisers can opt 
out of if they do not want to be bound.  For example, in an email, Google informed advertisers that 
the 2017 AdWords TOS added “a provision to use arbitration to resolve disputes rather than jury trials 
or class actions” and instructed advertisers that they could “[f]ollow the instructions in the dispute 
                                                 
1 Google’s business records show that Mr. Trudeau logged on in April 2012 to register Troy Martial 
Arts for an AdWords account.  (Decl. ¶ 14.)  Mr. Trudeau did not register a separate AdWords account 
for himself in an individual capacity.  (Id.)  Because Mr. Trudeau is the co-owner of Troy Martial Arts 
and the Complaint alleges that “Plaintiffs” collectively “entered into an agreement with Google,” 
Google does not distinguish between Plaintiffs for purposes of this Motion.  
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resolution section of the terms to opt out of this provision.”  (Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. E.)   
These notices each contained a link that directed advertisers to a webpage containing the 2017 
AdWords TOS, as shown below.  (Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. B.)   
At the top of page, Google advises advertisers to “Please review these terms carefully” and notifies 
them of the arbitration agreement and opt out: “They [the terms] include the use of binding arbitration 
to resolve disputes rather than jury trials or class actions. Please follow the instructions in the terms 
below if you wish to opt out of this provision.”  (Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. B.) 
The 2017 AdWords TOS is shown in the window in the middle of the page.  Advertisers can 
scroll through the terms in this window or print to review in hard copy (via the blue “Print” button).  
In the opening paragraph of the TOS, Google again advises advertisers:  “Please read these Terms 
carefully. They require the use of binding individual arbitration to resolve disputes rather than jury 
trials or class actions… Customer may opt out of the requirement to arbitrate disputes by following 
the instructions in Section 13(F) below.”  (Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. C.) 
At the bottom of the page, advertisers are given a choice to either click “Accept”—to indicate 
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“Yes, I have reviewed and accept the above Terms”—or “Decline,” and must then further click 
“Submit” to enter their selection. 
Advertisers who click to “Accept” the 2017 AdWords TOS then have 30 days to opt out of the 
Dispute Resolution Agreement if they do not want to be bound.  Section 13(F) explains the opt out 
procedure as follows: 
F.  30-day opt out period.  Customer (both for itself and for any Advertiser that Customer represents) and Advertiser have the right to opt out of this Dispute Resolution Agreement.  A Customer or Advertiser who does not wish to be bound by this Dispute Resolution Agreement (including its waiver of class and representative claims) must notify Google as set forth below within 30 days of the first acceptance date of any version of these Terms containing an arbitration provision (unless a longer period is required by applicable law).  Customer’s or Advertiser’s notice to Google under this subsection must be submitted via webform available at adwords.google.com/nav/arbitration.   
(Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. C at ¶ 13(F).)  Clicking the link shown above directs advertisers to a webpage from 
which they can opt out of arbitration by checking a box labeled “Opt out of arbitration” as shown at 
the screenshot below.  (Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. D.) 
Google notified Plaintiffs of the 2017 AdWords TOS by both email and an alert in the 
AdWords account of Troy Martial Arts.  Google’s data shows that Troy Martial Arts (1) accepted the 
2017 AdWords TOS on September 15, 2017 by clicking the “Accept” and “Submit” buttons shown 
above, and (2) did not opt out within the permitted 30-day period.  (Decl. ¶¶ 17-18.)  Thus, Plaintiffs 
agreed to the Dispute Resolution Agreement of the 2017 AdWords TOS, which provides: 
Google, Customer, and Advertiser agree to arbitrate all disputes and 
claims between Google and Customer or between Google and Advertiser that arise out of or relate in any way to the Programs or these Terms. 
(Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C at ¶ 13(A) (emphasis added).)  As Google further clarifies, this agreement to arbitrate 
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specifically applies to “claims that arose before Customer or Advertiser first accepted any version of 
these Terms containing an arbitration provision[.]”  (Id. (emphasis added).) 
III. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 
A. Legal Standards.2 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) establishes a “federal policy favoring arbitration” and 
requires courts to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (internal quotation and citations omitted).  The Supreme Court 
has instructed that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor 
of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an 
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).  Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
upheld arbitration provisions containing class action waivers.  See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 
570 U.S. 228, 239 (2013) (enforcing an arbitration agreement with a class action waiver and rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that the cost of individual arbitration would exceed the amount of potential 
recovery); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding that state law rules 
that purport to invalidate arbitration agreements with class action waivers are preempted by the FAA).  
Where a plaintiff purports to litigate claims that are subject to an enforceable arbitration agreement, 
the claim must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) because “the court loses its subject matter jurisdiction 
over any claims subject to [an] arbitration clause.”  Glaude v. Macy’s Inc., No. 12-cv-5179, 2012 WL 
6019069, at *3 & n.39 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of 
Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648-50 (1986)). 
B. Plaintiffs Agreed to Arbitrate the Claims in the Complaint and That Agreement Must be Enforced Under the FAA.  
There is no dispute here that Plaintiffs3 accepted the September 2017 TOS and declined to opt 
out of the Dispute Resolution Agreement, thus agreeing to “arbitrate all disputes and claims … that 
arise out of or relate in any way” to Google’s advertising programs or services, including AdWords. 
                                                 2 Legal standards applicable to the motion to dismiss are discussed infra, section IV, B. 3 As noted throughout, Troy Martial Arts entered into an agreement with Google, but Mr. Trudeau does not have a personal AdWords account.  (See Decl. ¶ 14.)  
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(Compl. ¶ 32; Decl. ¶¶ 10, 14-17, Ex. C at ¶ 13 (emphasis added)).  By clicking “Accept” and “Submit” 
on the webpage presenting the September 2017 TOS, Plaintiffs created a binding obligation to arbitrate 
claims pursuant to the terms of the Dispute Resolution Agreement.  See, e.g., Feldman v. Google, Inc., 
513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 238 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (enforcing a prior version of Google’s AdWords Terms of 
Service where users clicked a button indicating assent); Fagerstrom v. Amazon.com, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 
3d 1051, 1069 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Wiseley v. Amazon.com, Inc., 709 F. App’x 862 
(9th Cir. 2017) (“clickwrap” agreements are enforceable because they “require[] users to expressly 
manifest assent to the terms by, for example, clicking an ‘I accept’ button.”)).4  This undisputed fact 
alone requires that the Complaint be dismissed and Plaintiffs compelled to honor their agreement to 
bring “all disputes and claims” only in individual arbitration.   
C. The Dispute Resolution Agreement is Not Unconscionable.  
In an effort to avoid their voluntary agreement to arbitrate, Plaintiffs argue that the Dispute 
Resolution Agreement is unconscionable.  These arguments fail for multiple reasons. 
1. The Agreement is Not Procedurally Unconscionable Because Plaintiffs had the Ability to Freely Opt Out of Arbitration.  
Plaintiffs cannot avoid enforcement of the Dispute Resolution Agreement when they were 
given the opportunity to opt out and declined to do so.   (Decl. ¶ 18.)  As the Ninth Circuit has 
repeatedly held, “the existence of a meaningful right to opt out of [arbitration] necessarily renders the 
[arbitration clause] … procedurally conscionable as a matter of law.”  Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
848 F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted; brackets in original); see also Kilgore v. 
KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (no procedural unconscionability 
where arbitration clause permitted an opt out within 60 days); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 
F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (arbitration agreement enforceable and not procedurally 
unconscionable where party had 30 days to opt out of the agreement). 
This established law bars Plaintiffs from claiming procedural unconscionability, given the 
undisputed fact as recognized by this Court that “advertisers can freely opt out of the Dispute 
                                                 4 With respect to the prior AdWords TOS, Plaintiffs concede that agreeing to the “clickwrap” agreement constitutes valid acceptance.   (Compl. ¶ 32 (alleging that Plaintiffs “accepted, by way of a clickwrap contract, the AdWords terms of service” in 2012).) 
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Resolution Agreement” in the 2017 AdWords TOS.  AdTrader, 2018 WL 1876950, at *4.  Indeed, 
even where an opt-out provision is “buried in the agreement” and the steps to opt out are 
“burdensome,” the Ninth Circuit has held that the ability to opt out of arbitration precludes any finding 
of procedural unconscionability.  Mohamed, 848 F.3d at 1211.  The circumstances here present an 
even clearer case for enforcing the Dispute Resolution Agreement.  The opt-out in the 2017 AdWords 
TOS was not “buried in the agreement”; Google highlighted the requirement to arbitrate and the ability 
to opt-out in (1) multiple notices to advertisers, (2) at the top of the web page where advertisers were 
presented with the 2017 AdWords TOS, (3) in the first paragraph of the TOS itself, and (4) again at 
Section 13(F).  (Decl. ¶¶ 7-10, Ex. C); compare Lucas v. Hertz Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1004 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012) (finding that an arbitration agreement located on “the folder jacket” of certain documents 
and not on the rental agreement signed by the plaintiff was procedurally unconscionable, but only 
“moderately” so).  And in contrast to the process involved in Mohamed (requiring parties to opt out in 
person at Uber’s office or by overnight delivery), the 2017 AdWords TOS allows advertisers to opt 
out online with the click of a mouse or a tap of a finger.  (Id. ¶¶ 12-13, Ex. D.)  The ability for AdWords 
advertisers to “freely opt out” of arbitration, AdTrader, 2018 WL 1876950, at *4, unhindered by 
“buried” terms or “burdensome” steps, underscores why the Dispute Resolution Agreement must be 
enforced under Ninth Circuit law.  Mohamed, 848 F.3d at 1211.   
Plaintiffs may feign ignorance of the opt-out (and they strategically omit any mention of it in 
the Complaint) but they are presumed to have known of it when they clicked “Accept” to confirm that 
they “reviewed and accept the above Terms” including the Dispute Resolution Agreement.  (Decl. ¶ 
9, Ex. B); Mohamed, 848 F.3d at 1211 (explaining that the fact that an opt-out was “buried” “does not 
change the analysis” regarding enforceability because “one who signs a contract is bound by its 
provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity with the language of the instrument.”).  Plaintiffs’ 
agreement to arbitrate—despite the option to freely opt out—bars any claim that the Dispute 
Resolution Agreement is procedurally unconscionable.  Indeed, as this Court recognized, any 
purported harm that Plaintiffs might claim from being required to arbitrate would be “self-inflicted” 
given their voluntary choice not to opt out.  AdTrader, 2018 WL 1876950, at *5. 
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2. The Agreement is Not Substantively Unconscionable.  
Because the ability to opt out bars any finding of procedural unconscionability, the Court need 
go no further to enforce the Dispute Resolution Agreement and compel arbitration.  See Mohamed, 
848 F.3d at 1211 (declining to address substantive unconscionability issues because the availability of 
an opt-out was dispositive).  Even if it were relevant to consider the substantive terms of the 2017 
AdWords TOS, there is nothing in the arbitration agreement that comes close to meeting the high bar 
of substantive unconscionability, which requires terms that are so one-sided or harsh that they “shock 
the conscience.”  Bradford v. Flagship Facility Servs. Inc., No. 17-CV-01245, 2017 WL 3130072, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2017). 
Plaintiffs ask the Court to invalidate the Dispute Resolution Agreement and its class action 
waiver provision because “Plaintiffs and the average member of the proposed class would not have enough 
in the value of their individual claims to justify the costs of hiring an attorney to pursue those claims.”  
(Compl. ¶ 111.)  But this flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s holdings on class action waivers.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the specific argument that a class action waiver can be 
invalidated where plaintiffs “have no economic incentive to pursue their … claims individually in 
arbitration.”  See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 234 (enforcing arbitration provision with class action 
waiver despite plaintiff’s argument that enforcement would effectively prevent them from pursuing 
statutory rights); see also AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 352 (finding that the FAA preempts state law 
that bars enforcement of class action waivers). 
Nor can Plaintiffs credibly claim that the specific arbitration terms here are unfair, when the 
Dispute Resolution Agreement: 
 Is bilateral and applies equally to all parties, see Hoekman v. Tamko Bldg. Prods., No. 
14-1581, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113414, at *25 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (bilateral 
agreement weighs against unconscionability);  
 Is governed by American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) rules that are commonly 
used nationwide, (Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C at ¶ 13(C)); 
 Requires the arbitration to take place near the advertiser’s place of business, to alleviate 
potential burden concerns, (Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C at ¶ 13(C); compare Tompkins v. 
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23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2016) (forum selection clause not 
substantively unconscionable even where arbitrations required to take place in a 
location far away from counterparty); and 
 Requires Google to pay the arbitration fees in many instances, Ulbrich v. 
Overstock.com, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 924, 932-33 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding no 
substantive unconscionability where AAA rules required the party enforcing the 
arbitration provision to bear most of the fees).   
In combination, these even-handed provisions preclude any finding of substantive unconscionability.5 
While Plaintiffs complain that the arbitration agreement can potentially be applied to disputes 
arising before the 2017 AdWords TOS went into effect, courts have routinely enforced arbitration 
provisions with retroactive effect, even where parties were not given an opportunity to opt out.  See In 
re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1123–24 (D. Kan. 2003) 
(giving effect to a retroactive arbitration provision where the “language plainly and unambiguously 
states that the [new][] version of the dispute resolution provision applies to all of the parties’ claims, 
controversies, and disputes, regardless of whether they accrued before or after this revised provision 
took effect”) (collecting cases); In re Verisign, Inc., Derivative Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1224 
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding arbitration provision applied to claims that occurred prior to the execution 
of an agreement); In re: Lithium Ion Battery Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-02420, 2016 WL 5791357, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016) (finding claims subject to arbitration despite claims arising prior to the 
parties’ agreement).   
The fact that prior versions of the AdWords TOS provided that changes to terms would not 
apply retroactively is irrelevant to evaluating the enforceability of the current 2017 AdWords TOS.  
                                                 5 As further grounds for purported unconscionability, Plaintiffs also allege that “Google told all AdWords advertisers that if they chose not to accept the new terms and conditions, Google would suspend all of their advertisements on Google’s advertising platforms. Plaintiffs and the other members of the proposed class had spent years and countless funds utilizing and acclimating to Google’s platforms, yet all of that work and money would have been rendered pointless unless they agreed to surrender their rights to seek legal redress against Google.”  (Compl. ¶ 113.)  These allegations are false, as the Court noted in finding that advertisers are “are free to opt out of the new Dispute Resolution Agreement and continue using AdWords without interruption.” AdTrader, 2018 WL 1876950, at *4.  Moreover, if an advertiser declines the terms altogether, their account would simply be paused and the advertiser “can later resume using AdWords by accepting the new terms.”  Id. at *5.  Indeed, it is unclear what good faith basis Plaintiffs could have had to make these allegations. 
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Prior versions of the terms are no longer applicable, and Plaintiffs had every opportunity to review the 
September 2017 TOS to see that the arbitration agreement applies to claims involving facts that 
occurred before September 2017.  (Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C.)  Indeed, Google repeatedly advised advertisers 
to review the arbitration agreement.  (Decl. ¶ 7.)  Plaintiffs cannot claim they are somehow surprised 
by the scope of the arbitration agreement, when the Dispute Resolution Agreement prominently and 
unambiguously provides, in a separately numbered disclosure, that it applies to: “claims that arose 
before Customer or Advertiser first accepted any version of these Terms containing an arbitration 
provision[.]”  (Decl. ¶10, Ex. C at ¶ 13); see Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 168 Cal. App. 4th 938, 
958-59 (2008) (plaintiffs cannot claim reliance on obsolete contract terms where it “had a reasonable 
opportunity to discover the true terms of the [new] contract”); see also Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, 
N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding failure to read terms “fatal” to plaintiff’s claim and 
noting that “it is not reasonable to fail to read a contract before signing it”).  Plaintiffs’ decision not to 
opt-out of the Dispute Resolution Agreement thus constitutes voluntary agreement to arbitrate claims 
arising before September 2017.  Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574, 577 (W.D.N.C. 2000) 
(finding arbitration agreement retroactively enforceable, even where it was modified to include a class 
action waiver, because the new terms “clearly provide[] for a retroactive effect” and the plaintiff did 
not opt out).  Indeed, while Plaintiffs complain that enforcing the arbitration agreement here would be 
“retroactive,” their Complaint was filed five months after they agreed to the Dispute Resolution 
Agreement and it involves alleged ongoing acts by Google.  Regardless, any claim of harm arising 
from purported retroactivity would be entirely self-inflicted, given Plaintiffs’ voluntary choice to be 
bound to the arbitration agreement.  AdTrader, 2018 WL 1876950, at *5. 
Moreover, it does not appear that Plaintiffs have any viable claim that predates the 2017 TOS, 
making retroactivity a moot point.  Under the September 2017 Terms (as well as prior versions), 
advertisers seeking to dispute AdWords charges must do so within 60 days: “CUSTOMER  WAIVES 
ALL CLAIMS RELATING TO ANY PROGRAM CHARGES UNLESS A CLAIM IS MADE 
WITHIN THE CLAIM PERIOD” of 60 days.  (Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C at ¶ 8); see Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 
2d at 243 n.7 (holding that the 60-day provision in the AdWords TOS is enforceable); Free Range 
Content, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 14-cv-02329, 2016 WL 2902332, at *14 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2016) 
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(holding 30-day provision in Google AdSense TOS “is a reasonable amount of time in which to notify 
Google of a dispute.”) (Freeman, J.).  
.  Given this 60-day requirement, the only claims that Plaintiffs could assert would have to 
involve charges incurred in the 60-day period before the filing of the complaint on February 14, 
2018—that is, after December 16, 2017.  But by that date, Plaintiffs had already accepted the 
September 2017 Terms, including the arbitration agreement.  (Decl. ¶ 17.)  Because the 60-day 
requirement effectively limits the scope of disputes to charges incurred after Plaintiffs accepted the 
2017 TOS, their complaints about retroactivity are entirely irrelevant.  
D. All Claims in the FAC Fall Within the Broad Scope of the Dispute Resolution Agreement. 
There is no reasonable dispute that all six causes of action in the Complaint come within the 
scope of the arbitration agreement, which applies to all claims that “arise out of or relate in any way 
to” Plaintiffs’ AdWords activity as governed by the AdWords Terms of Service.  (Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C at 
¶ 13(A).)  Moreover, courts have consistently found that each type of claim alleged in the Complaint 
is appropriate for arbitration where, as here, they each touch on the subject matter of the parties’ 
agreement.  See Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that a breach of contract claim clearly “touches” the underlying agreement); Las Vegas Sands, 
Inc. v. Culinary Workers Union Local No. 226, 82 Fed. Appx. 580, 584 (9th Cir. 2003) (compelling 
arbitration of implied covenant claim as it involved “[i]ssues such as the nature of the contractual 
relationship and what the parties expected from one another as fair treatment are relevant to this 
inquiry.”); Ferguson v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
UCL, FAL and CLRA claims are arbitrable, including those that seek injunctive relief); DiGiacomo 
v. Ex’pression Ctr. for New Media Inc., No. 08-cv-1768, 2008 WL 4239830, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
15, 2008) (compelling equitable claims to arbitration where they touch on the subject matter of the 
contract; holding that “arbitrators have the power to grant all legal and equitable remedies, including 
declaratory and injunctive relief.”) (citations omitted); ValueSelling Assocs., LLC v. Temple, No. 09 
CV 1493, 2009 WL 3736264, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009) (“As the unjust enrichment claim is an 
extension of the other [] claims, it too is subject to arbitration.”).  
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E. The Court Should Compel Arbitration of All Claims Asserted by Mr. Trudeau. 
Mr. Trudeau’s claims must also be arbitrated because they are entirely derivative of the claim 
involving his company Troy Martial Arts.  Although Mr. Trudeau does not have a separate AdWords 
account, equitable estoppel prevents a party “from denying its obligation to arbitrate when it receives 
a ‘direct benefit’ from a contract containing an arbitration clause.”  Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara 
Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir. 1999).  Accordingly courts will compel arbitration on 
behalf of a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement where “the issues the [non-signatory] is seeking 
to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed.”  In re 
Apple & AT & TM Antitrust Litig., 826 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quotations omitted); 
cf. Evergreen Media Holdings, LLC v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, No. 15-01648, 2015 WL 
12765630, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2015) (enforcing arbitration clause as to non-signatory plaintiffs 
where “there is no dispute that Plaintiffs bring suit expressly to enforce obligations formed under” the 
agreement containing the arbitration provision).  Here, all of the claims derive from the contractual 
relationship between Google and Troy Martial Arts, of which Mr. Trudeau is a “co-owner.”  (Compl. 
¶ 17.)  Mr. Trudeau does not assert any additional claims against Google on behalf of himself.  Thus, 
any claims brought by Mr. Trudeau necessarily are interwoven with the claims of Troy Martial Arts, 
which are governed by the September 2017 AdWords TOS and contain an arbitration agreement.  As 
a result, Mr. Trudeau’s claims must be arbitrated.  
IV. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 
If the Court does not compel the entire action to arbitration, then Plaintiffs’ claims should 
nevertheless be dismissed as a matter of law.  
A. Additional Background Re: Negative Keywords and the Google Disclosures Omitted From the Complaint. 
Google’s AdWords platform allows advertisers to display ads on various Google properties, 
including Google Search, YouTube, and other websites.  (Decl. ¶ 3.)  For certain types of ads, the 
advertiser must select terms, called “keywords,” that are associated with an ad.  (Id.)  In the context of 
Google Search, the ad may then be shown next to search results that appear when someone enters a 
Google search query that includes the keywords the advertiser selected.  (Id.)  For example, an 
Case 5:18-cv-00947-BLF   Document 25   Filed 05/02/18   Page 21 of 33
 COOLEY LLP 
ATTO RN EY S AT LAW 
SAN  FR AN C I SC O 
 
 14. GOOGLE’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, OR ALTERNATIVELY TO DISMISS THE FAC, AND RJN (CASE NO. 5:18-CV-00753 BLF)  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
advertiser could choose the keywords “martial arts” in order to have the ad appear next to the results 
for Google searches using the term “martial arts.”  (Id.)   
Google also allows advertisers to use negative keywords to restrict which searches result in 
their ads being shown.  (Id. ¶ 4.)  If a user conducts a Google search using search terms that match an 
advertiser’s keywords but also includes terms that match the advertiser’s negative keywords, the 
advertiser’s ad will be blocked from being shown in response to the search.  (Id.)  For example, if an 
advertiser designates “lunch” as a keyword and “free” as a negative keyword, if a user searches for 
“free lunch”, the advertiser’s ad will not be displayed.6  
Plaintiffs’ claims involve the specific circumstance in which (1) a user’s search terms include 
an advertiser’s keywords, (2) the search terms do not match any of the advertiser’s selected negative 
keywords, but includes terms that are a misspelling or variation of the advertiser’s negative keywords, 
(3) Google corrects the user’s search terms for purposes of showing organic search results to the user, 
and (4) the advertiser’s ad is shown in connection with those search results.  (Compl. ¶¶ 40-45.)  In 
this situation, Plaintiffs claim that because Google corrected the spelling of the user’s search terms for 
purposes of showing organic search results, Google must also apply the corrected terms (not just the 
actual terms used in the search) to determine whether the ad should be blocked based on the 
advertiser’s negative keywords.  Put differently, Plaintiffs claim that Google must block ads from 
appearing not only where a user searches for a term matching an advertiser’s negative keywords, but 
also where the search includes misspellings or variations of a negative keyword.   
Google specifically explains to advertisers that negative keywords do not work this way.  In 
explaining how negative keywords differ from keywords with respect to misspellings, Google explains 
in its Help Center that:  
The main difference is that you’ll need to add synonyms, singular or plural versions, misspellings, and other close variations if you want 
to exclude them. 
(Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. H at 1.)7  Thus, if an advertiser “want[s] to exclude” an ad from appearing in response 
                                                 6 However, as Google discloses on its “About negative keywords” Help Center webpage, if a query is “longer than 10 words, and [][a] negative keyword follows that 10th word” the ad may still be shown.  (Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. H at 3.) 7 Prior versions of the “About negative keywords” Help Center webpage are attached as Exhibits F and G to the Sung Declaration.  
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to “misspellings” or “variations” of negative keywords, the user must “add” them as additional 
negative keywords.  Advertisers are therefore on notice that Google does not automatically identify 
misspellings and variations of negative keywords when it determines whether an ad should be blocked 
from appearing in response to a search.  To reinforce this point, Google further explains that: “Your 
ad might still show on searches or pages that contain close variations of your negative keyword 
terms.” (Id.)  Significantly, these disclosures are contained in the very Help Center pages that Plaintiffs 
claim to be misleading (Compl. ¶ 29), which Plaintiffs have selectively excerpted to omit Google’s 
recommendations to advertisers on how to account for misspellings and variations of negative 
keywords.  (Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. H.) 
As applied to the example used in the Complaint—in which a user intends to search for the 
negative keyword “Southfield” but types “Douthfield” (Compl. ¶ 44)—Google’s disclosures make clear 
that Plaintiffs’ ads “might still” appear in response to the search because it involves “a close variation” 
of the advertiser’s negative keyword.  (Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. H at 3.)  To avoid this result, Plaintiffs can simply 
“add … misspellings, and other close variations” of “Southfield” to their list of negative keywords if 
they want to block their ads from appearing when a user includes misspellings like “Douthfield” in a 
search.  (Compl. ¶ 52.)  Instead of following the straightforward process outlined in the Help Center, 
Plaintiffs have brought this Complaint in an attempt to shift the responsibility to Google.  The Complaint 
alleges six causes of action, all seeking to impose a purported obligation on Google to identify 
misspellings and other variations of terms, when advertisers neglect to include such variations in their 
negative keywords lists.  These claims all fail as a matter of law, for the following reasons.  
B. Motion to Dismiss Standards.  
A court should dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) when “there is no cognizable legal theory 
or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 
F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), “labels 
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not” survive a 
motion to dismiss.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted).  The Court 
is “free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping 
legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.”  Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO 
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Indus., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (citation and quotations omitted).  In addition, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that all averments of fraud, including “the circumstances 
constituting fraud,” must be stated “with particularity.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
C. Plaintiffs’ Breach of Contract Claim Fails For Multiple Reasons.  
1. Plaintiffs Do Not Identify Any Contract Term That Was Breached. 
Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim fails for the fundamental reason that Plaintiffs do not 
identify any specific contract term that Google allegedly breached.  See, e.g., Frezza v. Google Inc., 
No. 5:12-CV-00237, 2013 WL 1736788, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013) (dismissing breach of 
contract claim where plaintiffs failed to “present the contractual terms agreed upon” that were 
allegedly breached); Miron v. Herbalife Int’l, Inc., 11 F. App’x. 927, 929 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming 
dismissal of contract claim where the plaintiff “failed to allege any provision of the contract which 
supports their claim”). 
Here, Plaintiffs allege in conclusory terms that “Google has violated its contractual obligations 
in a number of ways,” without identifying a single term that Google allegedly violated.  (Compl. ¶ 
85.)  Such conclusory allegations are insufficient as a matter of law.  Frezza, 2013 WL 1736788, at 
*2; Parrish v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 
(dismissing breach of contract claim and explaining: “[e]ven if plaintiffs had pleaded the existence or 
legal effect of a contract, they have failed to allege what provision of the relevant [contract] was 
breached by defendants.”); Dunkel v. eBay Inc., No. 5:12-CV-01452-EJD, 2013 WL 415584, at *8–9 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2013) (“Even if Plaintiffs had properly alleged that the attached exhibits constituted 
a contract or otherwise pointed to a contract, their claim would still fail because they did not allege 
which provisions of this contract Defendant has breached.”). 
Plaintiffs’ failure to identify a contract term that supports their claim is hardly surprising, as 
the TOS that governs the use of AdWords8 contains no provision that imposes, or even suggests, an 
obligation on Google to block ads from appearing in response to misspellings or variations of negative 
keywords.  (See Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C.)  Indeed, the Terms of Service make no mention of negative 
                                                 8 Plaintiffs concede that the AdWords Terms of Service governs their use of the AdWords Service.  (Compl. ¶ 32.) 
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keywords at all.  While the Complaint refers to statements in Google’s Help Center page regarding 
negative keywords, Plaintiffs do not attempt to argue that these statements constitute part of their 
contract.  Parrish, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (where “statements were not part of any contracts . . . 
plaintiffs cannot rely on them to allege the terms of any contract.”).  Nor could they, because the Help 
Center page undercuts Plaintiffs’ claims by explaining (in statements that Plaintiffs strategically 
omitted from the Complaint) that ads can be shown in response to misspellings and variations of 
negative keywords, unless advertisers affirmatively add those variations as additional negative 
keywords.  (Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. H at 1.)   
The Court should not allow Plaintiffs to impose a purported obligation on Google that is not 
grounded in any contract term and is affirmatively contradicted by Google’s disclosures.  
2. No Allegation of Compliance. 
Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim also fails because they neglect to allege their “performance 
or excuse for failure to perform” a key contractual obligation that is a condition to asserting their 
claims.  McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1489 (2006).  Under the 
AdWords TOS, advertisers seeking to dispute charges must do so within 60 days: “CUSTOMER 
WAIVES ALL CLAIMS RELATING TO ANY PROGRAM CHARGES UNLESS A CLAIM IS 
MADE WITHIN THE CLAIM PERIOD” of 60 days.  (Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C at ¶ 8.)  Nowhere in the 
Complaint do Plaintiffs plead compliance with this obligation, which is an enforceable prerequisite to 
their claims.  See Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 243 n.7 (holding that the 60-day provision in the 
AdWords TOS is enforceable).  Indeed, Plaintiffs appear to intentionally omit any mention of when 
their claims first arose, in an apparent effort to obscure whether they complied with this obligation.  
Plaintiffs’ failure to plead compliance with this contractual requirement provides further grounds to 
dismiss the breach of contract claim as a matter of law. 
D. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Breach of Implied Covenant Fails Along With the Breach of Contract Claim.  
Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails for 
similar reasons.  “Under California law, a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing requires that a contract exists between the parties, that the plaintiff performed his contractual 
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duties or was excused from nonperformance, [and] that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a benefit 
conferred by the contract in violation of the parties’ expectations at the time of contracting ….”  Avila 
v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 10-CV-05485-LHK, 2010 WL 5071714, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 
2010) (emphasis added).  As discussed, the Complaint fails to show that Google had any contractual 
obligation to block ads from being shown when users search for misspellings or variation of an 
advertisers’ negative keywords.  Plaintiffs thus cannot claim they were deprived of any “benefit 
conferred by the contract.”  Id. 
Further, a claim for breach of the implied covenant requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate that 
Google disappointed Plaintiffs’ “reasonable expectation[s].”  Avila, 2010 WL 5071714, at *5 
(dismissing claim for failure to show that alleged expectations were reasonable).  Here, Plaintiffs were 
on notice that advertisers must “add … misspellings, and other close variations” to their negative 
keywords, if they do not want their ads to appear when a user’s search includes misspellings and 
variations.  (Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. H at 1.)  Plaintiffs cannot claim to have reasonably expected Google to 
automatically block ads from appearing in response to misspellings and variations of negative 
keywords, when Google’s disclosures actively contradict any such obligation.9  (Id.) 
E. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege the Reasonable Reliance Needed to Support Their Fraud-Based Claims. 
Plaintiffs’ attempt to repackage their allegations of contractual breach as fraud-based claims 
fares no better.  With respect to Plaintiffs’ claim under the “fraudulent” prong of the Unfair 
Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq., Plaintiffs “must 
demonstrate actual reliance on the allegedly deceptive or misleading statements” that are the basis of 
the claim.  In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 306 (2009).  The same requirement of actual 
reliance also applies to Plaintiffs’ claim under the False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Business & 
Professions Code § 17500 et seq.  See Baxter v. Intelius, Inc., No. SACV 09-1031, 2010 WL 3791487, 
                                                 9 And if these disclosures are deemed to be part of Plaintiffs’ contract, then Plaintiffs’ claim would run afoul of the established rule that plaintiffs may not impose an implied obligation (that Google must block ads from appearing in response to misspelled negative keywords) that contradicts an express term (that advertisers need to account for misspellings and variations.).  Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 349-50 (2000) (established law precludes a plaintiff or class from “impos[ing] substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement.”). 
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at *3, *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010) (explaining that “[f]or UCL and FAL claims, the Plaintiffs must 
sufficiently allege … that there was actual reliance by the Plaintiffs” and dismissing claims where 
Plaintiffs did “not contend that they actually relied on any statements by the Defendants.”). 
Plaintiffs make no such allegation in the Complaint.  Indeed, Plaintiffs do not allege that they 
ever saw the Help Center pages referenced in the Complaint, let alone that they relied on the specific 
alleged misleading statements in deciding to use AdWords.  The failure to allege these necessary facts 
is fatal to Plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims under any pleading standard, and certainly under the 
heightened standards of Rule 9(b) applicable to these claims.10  
Even if Plaintiffs could allege that they read the Help Center pages in question, it would only 
undermine their claims further.  Plaintiffs pursuing fraud-based claims must allege not only that they 
relied on the alleged misstatements at issue, but also that such reliance was reasonable.  See, e.g., 
Woods v. Google, Inc., 5:11-cv-01263, 889 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  Where a plaintiff 
claims to have been misled, but the defendants’ disclosures accurately address the topic at issue, any 
purported reliance is not reasonable as a matter of law.  Id. (dismissing UCL and FAL claims because 
plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on alleged misstatements that contradicted the plain language 
of the applicable contract); Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 168 Cal. App. 4th 938, 958-59 (2008) 
(explaining that there can be no reasonable reliance where plaintiff “had a reasonable opportunity to 
discover the true terms of the contract”); Davis, 691 F.3d at 1162 (dismissing FAL claim where 
“advertising was not likely to deceive a reasonable consumer” because no “reasonable consumer” 
would believe an annual fee would not apply in light of a disclaimer to the contrary).   
Here, Plaintiffs claim they were led to believe that Google would block their ads from 
appearing in response to searches that include misspellings and variation of negative keywords.  But 
again, the very Help Center pages that Plaintiffs claim were misleading expressly clarify that ads 
                                                 10 When a plaintiff “allege[s] a unified course of fraudulent conduct and rel[ies] entirely on that course of conduct as the basis of that claim,” its claim is said to “sound in fraud” and must meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).  See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Rosado v. eBay, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-04005, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89863, at *19 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2014) (“Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement applies to each of the three prongs of the UCL . . . where, as here, the claims are based on a ‘unified course of fraudulent conduct’”) (citing Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1126-27).   
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“might still show” in response to searches “that contain close variations of your negative keyword 
terms,” unless advertisers follow Google’s recommended steps.  (Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. H at 3.)  These 
disclosures foreclose any claim of reasonable reliance and warrant dismissal of the fraud-based claims 
with prejudice.  (Indeed, it is ironic that Plaintiffs are accusing Google of engaging in deceptive 
conduct when they have selectively omitted the disclosures that undercut their claims from the 
Complaint.) 
F. Plaintiffs’ Claims Under the Other Prongs of UCL Also Fail as a Matter of Law. 
1. Plaintiffs Allege No “Unfair” Conduct. 
Under the “unfair” prong, Plaintiffs make the conclusory and unsupported allegation that 
Google engaged in activity that was “unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and violative of fundamental 
policies of” California.  (Compl. ¶ 98.)  This claim fails for multiple reasons. 
First, Plaintiffs’ claim for “unfair” conduct merely parrots the same defective allegations as 
the claim for “fraudulent” conduct.  (See. Compl. ¶ 99, repeating allegation that “Plaintiffs and other 
members of the public are likely to be deceived by Google’s false representation that such AdWords 
users’ ads would not be displayed in search results generated from search terms that include negative 
keywords.”)  This effort to manufacture a claim for “unfair” conduct under the UCL should be 
dismissed along with the “fraudulent” claim for the same reasons above.  In Kearns, the Court held 
that where a UCL claim for “unfair” conduct is based on the same facts as a UCL claim for 
“fraudulent” conduct, a court is not required to “separately analyz[e] [the plaintiff’s] claims under the 
unfairness prong of the UCL.”  Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1126-27; see also Hovsepian v. Apple, Inc., No. 
08-5788, 2009 WL 5069144, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2009) (applying Kearns and dismissing UCL 
claim brought under both “fraudulent” and “unfair” prongs for failure to meet Rule 9(b)). 
Second, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Google had a legal obligation to refrain from charging 
them for clicks where Plaintiffs failed to follow Google’s Help Center instructions and disclosures.  
Woods, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1195 (noting that Plaintiffs must plead facts showing that they “had a legal 
right…that was violated” to “show any cognizable injury”).  Plaintiffs fail to establish that Google 
owed Plaintiffs any such obligation.  This is similar to Woods v. Google, Inc., where the plaintiffs 
failed to allege that Google owed them a legal right to specific discounts and thus the Court held that 
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plaintiffs had “failed to state a claim under the unfair prong of the UCL.”  889 F. Supp. 2d at 1195. 
Third, Plaintiffs fail to properly allege that Google’s alleged actions are “unfair” under any 
formulation of that term.  California courts have three tests for what constitutes “unfair” conduct for 
the purposes of the UCL, none of which Plaintiffs can satisfy here.  For example, courts have applied 
a three-part test that considers whether “the consumer injury [1] is substantial, [2] is not outweighed 
by any countervailing benefit to consumers or to competition, and [3] is not an injury the consumers 
themselves could reasonably have avoided.”  Woods, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1195 (quoting Daugherty v. 
Am. Honda Motor Co., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 839 (2006)); see also Singh v. Google Inc., No. 16-CV-
03734, 2017 WL 2404986, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2017) (Freeman, J.).  Plaintiffs fail this test because 
they could have readily avoided their purported injury by simply reading and following Google’s 
explanations on the Help Center page regarding negative keywords  
Other courts have applied a balancing test to determine whether conduct was unfair under the 
UCL.  Under that standard, “a practice is ‘unfair’ when it offends an established public policy or when 
the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers,” 
although those considerations must be balanced against “the utility of the defendant’s practice.”  
Singh, 2017 WL 2404986, at *4 (citations omitted).  Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory, 
boilerplate, and simply track the language of this balancing test without explaining exactly why 
Google’s practices are allegedly “unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and violative of fundamental 
policies” of California.  (Compl. at ¶ 98.)   Such conclusory allegations must be dismissed.  Davidson 
v. Wakefield, 167 F. App’x 588, 589 (9th Cir. 2006) (“conclusory allegations are insufficient to state 
a claim for relief.”).  Still other courts have applied the “tethering test,” whereby the public policy 
underlying the claim “must be tethered to specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory 
provisions.”  Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Ass’n, 182 Cal. App. 4th 247, 257 (2010).  Plaintiffs 
have likewise failed to identify any such specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions.  
San Miguel v. HP Inc., No. 5:16-CV-05820, 2018 WL 1536766, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2018) 
(under the tethering test, finding allegations too broad where plaintiffs only make general allegations 
that the practices are contrary to public policy). 
Finally, even assuming that Plaintiffs had alleged that the Help Center page is part of the 
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contract, courts have routinely dismissed UCL claims where the defendant “complied with the express 
terms of the contracts, and charged plaintiffs in accordance with their terms.”  Spiegler v. Home Depot 
U.S.A., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2008).  In these circumstances, “the UCL cannot 
be used to rewrite [the parties’] contracts or to determine whether the terms of their contracts are fair.”  
Id. at 1046; see also Guerard v. CBA Financial Corp., 2009 WL 3152055, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 
2009) (dismissing UCL and FAL claims because “the interpretation of the clear and unambiguous 
terms of the policy cannot constitute an unfair, unlawful or fraudulent act . . . .”); Janda v. T-Mobile, 
USA, Inc., No. 05-03729, 2009 WL 667206, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2009) (dismissing UCL and 
CLRA claims where the defendant charged fees consistent with its contract terms and disclosures); 
Samura v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 1299 n.6 (1993) (“The [unfair 
prong] does not give the courts a general license to review the fairness of contracts . . . .”).  In this 
case, Google’s Help Center webpage is clear that advertisers must account for misspellings and 
variations of negative keywords. 
2. Plaintiffs Allege No “Unlawful” Conduct. 
Under the “unlawful” prong, Plaintiffs argue that Google violated the UCL by “engaging in an 
unlawful act or practice by, inter alia, charging Plaintiffs for clicks on ads that appeared with search 
terms that were on their list of negative keywords.” (Compl. ¶ 95.)  Plaintiffs do not cite any statute 
that addresses this issue and must therefore be relying on their claim of a contractual breach, which 
itself fails for the reasons above.  And even if Plaintiffs had pled a viable breach of contract claim, 
common law claims such as breach of contract cannot serve as a predicate act under the “unlawful” 
prong of the UCL as a matter of law.  See, e.g., Hartless v. Clorox Co., No. 06-cv-2705, 2007 WL 
3245260, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2007) (analyzing case law and concluding that a common law claim 
cannot serve as a predicate act for the UCL’s unlawful prong); AccuImage Diagnostics Corp. v. 
Terarecon, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 941, 954-55 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“While section 17200 has broad 
application, . . . its scope is restricted to violations of law, not contract.”) (citation omitted).  
G. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Declaratory Relief. 
Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the September 2017 AdWords TOS are unconscionable.  
However, “[d]eclaratory relief is an equitable remedy which fails to the extent that the underlying 
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claims fail.” Wornum v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., No. 11-2189, 2011 WL 3516055, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 11, 2011) (citation omitted).  As outlined in Google’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, the parties 
entered into a valid arbitration agreement that is both enforceable and applicable to all of Plaintiffs’ 
claims. This Court should deny with prejudice Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief. 
H. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Unjust Enrichment.  
Plaintiffs also make a claim for unjust enrichment, arguing simply that “Plaintiffs and the other 
members of the proposed class were subject to improper and unlawful charges.”  (Compl. ¶ 118.)  
However, it is undisputed that Troy Martial Arts accepted the AdWords Terms of Service, and 
California law does not allow an independent unjust enrichment claim where the parties have entered 
into a contract.  GA Escrow, LLC v. Autonomy Corp. PLC, No. 08-01784, 2008 WL 4848036, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2008) (“A plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss an ‘unjust enrichment’ cause 
of action if the complaint also alleges tort claims and claims based on the existence of a valid, express 
contract between the parties.”); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 718 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (“Because Plaintiffs allege that an express contract existed between themselves and Defendant, 
they cannot also assert an unjust enrichment claim”). 
Finally, even if the Court were to generously construe Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim as a 
claim for quasi-contract, that claim still fails.  Under a theory of quasi-contract, restitution “may be 
awarded where the defendant obtained a benefit from the plaintiff by fraud, duress, conversion, or 
similar conduct.”  McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal. App. 4th 379, 388 (2004).  As discussed above, 
Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts to show any “fraud … or similar conduct.”  Moreover, “[t]here 
is no equitable reason for invoking restitution when the plaintiff gets the exchange which he expected.” 
Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1371 (2010) (citations and quotations omitted).  
Here, Google explained that advertisers must account for misspellings and variations of negative 
keywords, and Plaintiffs received exactly what they should have expected, had they read the Help 
Center page referenced in the Complaint.  There is no “equitable reason” for permitting recovery on a 
quasi-contract basis here. 
V. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 
In support of the Motion to Dismiss, Google requests that the Court take judicial notice of 
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Exhibits B, C, F, G, and H to the Sung Declaration for the following reasons. 
First, Federal Rule of Evidence 201 requires judicial notice of facts “not subject to reasonable 
dispute” that are either (1) “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction”; or (2) “can 
be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”  
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), (c)(2).  Courts routinely take judicial notice of website contents under Rule 201.  
See, e.g., Frances Kenny Family Tr. v. World Savs. Bank FSB, No. 04-3724, 2005 WL 106792, at *1 
n.1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2005) (taking judicial notice of content on plaintiffs’ website); Kinderstart.com, 
LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 06-2057, 2007 WL 831806, at *21 n.20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (taking 
judicial notice of pages on defendant Google’s website). 
The Court should consider Exhibits B, C, and H for the same reason because they are public 
webpages whose contents are not subject to reasonable dispute. (See Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10, 22, Exs. B, C, 
H.)11  This is also true for Exhibits F and G, which are prior versions of the “About negative keywords” 
Help Center webpage.  Courts routinely take judicial notice of archived versions of websites.  See, 
e.g., Dzinesquare, Inc. v. Armano Luxury Alloys, Inc., No. 14-1918, 2014 WL 12597154, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 22, 2014). 
Second, a document can be considered at the motion to dismiss stage “if the complaint 
specifically refers to the document and if its authenticity is not questioned.”  Solis v. Webb, 931 F. 
Supp. 2d 936, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quotations omitted).  Further, a document is “incorporated by 
reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms 
the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis 
added).  Both the September 2017 AdWords Terms of Service (Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10, Exs. B, C),  and the 
“About negative keywords” Help Center webpage (Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. H) are cited in support of plaintiffs’ 
claims, and thus “form[] the basis of the plaintiff’s claim” and are therefore incorporated by reference. 
Sharp v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 14-CV-00831, 2015 WL 106844, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2015), 
aff’d, 701 F. App’x 596 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908); see also Song fi Inc. v. 
                                                 11 Exhibits A and D to the Sung Declaration are offered only in connection with Google’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and thus are not subject to the evidentiary limitations of a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion.  Regardless, Exhibits A and D, are publicly available materials from Google’s website and would be appropriate for judicial notice for the same reasons. Moreover, Exhibit E is an email sent from Google directly to Mr. Trudeau, also capable of judicial notice.  
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Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 880, 884-85 & n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (considering YouTube’s Terms 
of Service cited in the complaint as incorporated by reference in granting motion to dismiss).  These 
materials are therefore incorporated by reference and should be considered by the Court.  In particular, 
the “About negative keywords” Help Center webpage should be considered in its entirety to prevent 
plaintiffs from benefiting from their incomplete and misleading description of the webpage.  See 
Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007); Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 
1190, 1201 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (considering blogpost that plaintiffs “selectively quote[d]” as 
incorporated by reference). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Google respectfully requests that the Court dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs’ entire lawsuit for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, given the parties’ valid and enforceable arbitration agreement.  In 
the alternative, Google respectfully requests that the Court dismiss with prejudice each of Plaintiffs’ 
claims against Google for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
 
 Dated:  May 2, 2018  COOLEY LLP  
/s/ Whitty Somvichian 
Whitty Somvichian Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE LLC           
171277839   
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